Since its inception, the United Nations has contained a fundamental contradiction. Article 2, Paragraph 1 of the UN Charter explicitly states that the organization is based on the principle of "sovereign equality" among all its member states (UN Charter, 1945). However, this principle is effectively set aside by the existence of the veto power held by the five permanent members of the Security Council: the United States, Russia, China, the United Kingdom, and France. The veto cannot be viewed merely as a technical flaw or a byproduct of the post-World War II order. Rather, it is a structural anomaly - something that is fundamentally abnormal, inconsistent, and even contradictory to the system's own foundations. As noted by several international law scholars, the permanent veto is "the most central and problematic feature of the current UN constitution" (Panggabean, 2025). Its absolute nature and lack of clear legal boundaries have repeatedly hindered humanitarian action and paralyzed UN institutions in responding to various crises. This anomaly creates structural inequality among member states and gradually erodes the legitimacy and overall effectiveness of the UN (Aldrighi, 2025).
The consequences of this structural paralysis are all too evident when permanent members use their veto power to protect their allies or strategic interests. The conflict in Syria since 2011 has become a classic case study of how the veto hinders collective action. As of February 2017, Russia had vetoed seven Security Council resolutions aimed at protecting civilians and imposing sanctions on the Bashar al-Assad regime, while China had vetoed six resolutions since the civil war began (BBC News, 2017). One of the most striking incidents occurred on October 4, 2011, just six months after the conflict began, when Russia and China blocked a resolution condemning severe human rights violations in Syria and threatening action against the Assad regime (UN Security Council, 2011). As a result of this deadlock, "meaningful enforcement actions against Assad or senior regime officials have been stymied" (Human Rights Watch, 2017). The conflict has resulted in immense human suffering, with millions displaced and a devastating loss of life, yet meaningful accountability for the victims remains largely absent.
In Southeast Asia, the crisis in Myanmar and the plight of the Rohingya people offer another illustration of how the veto protects a military junta from international condemnation. In May 2022, as the humanitarian situation in Myanmar deteriorated following the coup, Russia and China again used their veto power to block a Security Council resolution expressing concern (The Diplomat, 2022). Both countries consistently rejected stronger action on grounds of non-intervention, while critics pointed to Beijing's economic interests behind its support for the junta (Amnesty International, 2022). Consequently, although the General Assembly and various UN bodies have repeatedly condemned human rights violations in Myanmar, the Security Council has remained paralyzed. More than one million Rohingya refugees still live in camps in Bangladesh without certainty of a safe and dignified return (UNHCR, 2025).
The tragedy in Ukraine since Russia's invasion in February 2022 has revealed the most absurd aspect of this structural anomaly: a permanent member of the Security Council, which is theoretically responsible for maintaining world peace, can use its veto power to block a resolution condemning its own aggression. On February 25, 2022, the day after the invasion began, Russia vetoed a Security Council resolution condemning the invasion and calling for the immediate withdrawal of Russian forces (UN News, 2022). In September 2022, Russia again vetoed a resolution describing the attempt to annex four Ukrainian regions as a "threat to international peace and security" (UN News, 2022). Even UN Secretary-General António Guterres had to state that "the UN Charter is clear" - that the annexation of a state's territory by another state as a result of the threat or use of force constitutes a violation of the Charter's principles (Guterres, 2022). Yet a state that violates the Charter is entitled to protect itself from the consequences of international law through the veto. This vicious cycle causes the Security Council to lose its legitimacy.
In the Middle East, the United States has also faced criticism for using its veto power to protect its ally, Israel. Between October 2023 and June 2025, the United States vetoed at least five Security Council resolutions calling for a ceasefire in Gaza. On September 18, 2025, the U.S. again vetoed a resolution demanding an immediate, unconditional, and permanent ceasefire in the Gaza Strip, despite support from 14 of the 15 Security Council members (UN News, 2025). The resolution also demanded the release of all hostages held by Hamas and that Israel lift all restrictions on the entry of humanitarian aid. In each instance, the U.S. argued that the resolution failed to condemn Hamas or recognize Israel's right to self-defense (U.S. Mission to the UN, 2025). The consequences have been devastating: more than 65,000 Palestinians have been killed since the conflict began in October 2023 (UN OCHA, 2025), and starvation is spreading in the besieged territory. One academic analysis concluded that the veto has evolved "from a tool for building great-power consensus into a strategic obstructionist instrument, undermining the Council's effectiveness in addressing mass humanitarian crises" (Martinali, 2024).
The latest statistics confirm that this paralysis is worsening. In 2024, the permanent members of the Security Council exercised their veto eight times, the highest number since the end of the Cold War in 1991 (CIVICUS Lens, 2026). Although the number of vetoes dropped to four in 2025 (two by the U.S. on Gaza and two by Russia on Ukraine), the Security Council was able to adopt only 44 resolutions that year, the lowest number since 1991 (UN Security Council, 2025). More concerning, only about 61.4 percent of these resolutions were adopted unanimously, reflecting a continuing erosion of consensus (UN General Assembly, 2025). Meanwhile, in 2024, the Security Council held 305 meetings but was able to adopt only 46 resolutions, of which only 30 were adopted unanimously (Security Council Report, 2025). Austria, in its statement to the General Assembly, noted that the use of the veto in 2024 had reached its highest level since the Cold War, "in situations where there was a clear and urgent need to act" (Permanent Mission of Austria to the UN, 2025).
Former UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon did not hesitate to criticize this situation. In an interview in December 2025, he described the Security Council as "the UN's most visible point of failure" and accused some permanent members of using their veto power to "shield themselves, their allies, or their proxies from accountability" (The National, 2025). "Today, the Council is deadlocked on nearly every issue," Ban said, "leading members are undermining the UN's peace and security mandate by using the veto to shield themselves and others from scrutiny." Without concrete limits on what he described as "the arbitrary use or abuse of the veto," Ban warned that without meaningful reform, "the UN risks teetering toward collapse or irrelevance" (The National, 2025).
It is a bitter irony that one of the most significant efforts to address this structural paralysis has come from the General Assembly, rather than the Security Council itself. On April 26, 2022, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 76/262, which came to be known as the "Veto Initiative" or the "Standing Mandate for a General Assembly Debate when a Veto is Cast." This initiative grants the General Assembly a permanent mandate to hold a debate within 10 working days after a veto is exercised in the Security Council (UN General Assembly Resolution 76/262, 2022). As stated by its supporters, "Resolution 76/262 exists to remind everyone that the veto is not a privilege but a responsibility, a responsibility that must be taken seriously by all permanent members of the Security Council" (Global Governance Institute, 2022). This initiative provides an accountability mechanism, ensuring that "the veto is not exercised in silence but is subject to the scrutiny of the international community" (Center for UN Reform, 2023). However, this initiative is procedural in nature and lacks binding force. It cannot override a veto or compel the Security Council to act. It is merely a spotlight in a dark room - important, but not enough to illuminate the entire darkness.
Calls for more fundamental structural reforms continue to echo from around the world. The African Union, through the Ezulwini Consensus adopted in 2005, demands at least two permanent seats for Africa with full veto power, as well as five non-permanent seats (African Union, 2005). On the 20th anniversary of the consensus in 2025, the African Union's Committee of Ten (C-10) reaffirmed its demand to end Africa's historical exclusion from the world's most powerful peace and security body (African Union C-10, 2025). Kenyan President William Ruto stated that Africa's continued exclusion is a "grave injustice that must be rectified" (NBC News, 2026). Some countries have even called for the complete abolition of the veto right or at least a mechanism allowing the General Assembly to challenge the veto. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz also supports expanding the Security Council, saying, "The world has changed, and the UN must change with it" (Deutsche Welle, 2024). In multilateral forums, other proposals that frequently emerge include restricting the use of the veto in cases of mass humanitarian crises, requiring permanent members to provide public justification, and mandating a supermajority in the General Assembly to uphold the veto (Elders Commission, 2023).
As the UN enters its eighth decade since its founding in 2025, the question is no longer whether Security Council reform is necessary, but how much damage will be done before that reform actually takes place. The permanent veto, as a structural anomaly embedded in the very foundation of the UN system, has transformed the Security Council from a guardian of global peace into an instrument of institutional impotence. From Syria to Ukraine, from Myanmar to Gaza, the same pattern repeats: a majority of member states support action to protect civilians and uphold international law, yet a single veto is often enough to stall collective action. As one foreign policy analyst wrote, "The Security Council has become a theater of the absurd where great powers stand atop the ruins of international law and declare victory" (Foreign Policy, 2024). While world leaders continue to spout rhetoric about reform, millions of lives continue to be lost and confidence in multilateralism is crumbling.
Without fundamental changes to this structural anomaly - whether through legal restrictions on the use of the veto in humanitarian crises, the expansion of the Council's membership, or even the gradual abolition of the veto - the UN Security Council will continue to lose its relevance as a credible guardian of world peace. As Ban Ki-moon has cautioned, reform is not an option; without it, the UN risks heading toward "collapse or irrelevance" (The National, 2025). This structural anomaly, which has been allowed to persist for eight decades, will ultimately determine the fate of the multilateral system itself. The question is: will the international community wait until this anomaly destroys the entire system, or will they finally have the courage to fix it?
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